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How We Think about Economics 
 
Bart J. Wilson* 
 
7 May 2017 
 
There is no more light in a genius than in any other honest man – but he has a particular 
kind of lens to concentrate this light into a burning point.  
~ Ludwig Wittgenstein 
 
If there is a favorite sentence that encapsulates Vernon Smith’s contribution to how I 
think about economics, it is the first one in the second footnote of his Nobel lecture: “Doing 
experimental economics has changed the way I think about economics” (reprinted in Smith, 
2003; p. 465).  He elaborates further: 
There are many reasons for this, but one of the most prominent is that designing and 
conducting experiments forces you to think through the process rules and procedures of 
an institution. Few, like Einstein, can perform detailed and imaginative mental 
experiments. Most of us need the challenge of real experiments to discipline our thinking 
(p. 465). 
By training and self-selection, economists are deep-seated consequentialists, 
methodological positivists, and serial nominalizers.  What matters to us are the outcomes of an 
economic experiment:  double auctions are 90 to 100% efficient without complete information 
on the conditions of supply and demand; Dutch and first-price sealed bid auctions are 
theoretically, but not behaviorally isomorphic; asset markets reliably bubble and crash in the 
laboratory even with common knowledge of the dividend distribution; the solution concept of a 
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium rather poorly organizes actual play in two-person games; etc. 
We tend to treat such outcomes in part as having learned something objective about the 
world.   We positivistically reject the assumption of complete information for a market to clear, 
appending our discipline’s mantra of “Incentives matter” with the phrase “because institutions 
matter.”  We also positivistically reject the assumption that common priors make asset markets 
efficient, and we positivistically reject the assumption that people always prefer more money to 
less.  Our inclination is to explain these findings in terms of what Levitt and List (2007) call “deep 
structural parameters,” some nouns for which include risk aversion, fairness, reciprocity, 
inequality aversion, ambiguity aversion, overconfidence, overoptimism, to name but a few. 
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From my casual observation, many economists were surprised at the content of Vernon’s 
Nobel lecture on ecological and constructivist rationality in economics.  Having been awarded 
the prize “for having established laboratory experiments as a tool in empirical economic analysis, 
especially in the study of alternative market mechanisms,” I think many expected him to 
catalogue the major findings of experimental economics in his prize lecture.1  David Porter has 
described Vernon as a live, interactive version of the Journal of Economic Literature.  But Vernon 
Smith is no cataloguer. He is a synthesizer, and he synthesizes acutely aware that scientific inquiry 
is not wholly objective, that he himself is part of the scientific process.  In his book, Rationality in 
Economics, Vernon quotes the Goethean scholar of science Henri Bortoft in the epigraph to 
chapter 10: 
Science believes itself to be objective, but is in essence subjective because the witness is 
compelled to answer questions which the scientist himself has formulated. Scientists 
never notice the circularity in this because they hear the voice of “nature” speaking, not 
realizing it is the transposed echo of their own voice (Bortoft, 1996; p. 17). 
As a reader of the chemist and philosopher of science Michael Polanyi, Vernon might push back 
a little on Bortoft and say that science is neither wholly objective, nor wholly subjective.  Rather, 
science is personal.  In so far as science establishes contact with the external world, like in a 
laboratory experiment, it is not subjective; but in so far as our inquiry is guided by individual 
passions to learn something, it is not objective either (Polanyi, 1956; p. 315).  Designing and 
conducting economic experiments is, as Ludwig Wittgenstein says of philosophy, “really more a 
working on oneself. On one’s own interpretation. On one’s way of seeing things. (And what one 
expects of them)” (1980; p. 16e). 
 What do I mean by that?  Consider Vernon’s first economic experiment published in the 
Journal of Political Economy, the now canonical double auction experiment (1962).  As I have 
heard him say many times, Vernon conducted his experiment in the spring of 1956 with the 
expectation that the results would deviate from the competitive equilibrium.  Note how it was 
personal.  His priors, his way of thinking about the world, were that the competitive equilibrium 
would fail to organize the data with private information, but he was curious to see what might 
happen.  He had a passion to explore his own interpretation of his economics training.  Nature 
wasn’t speaking to him. The transposed echo of his own voice led him to formulate the question 
and experiment. 
 He was surprised then when the first session converged so readily and efficiently to the 
competitive equilibrium.  That was not, as he has said, what his “Harvard education” had taught 
him would happen.  In case it was fluke, he ran another session with the same result. Then he 
started tinkering with the parameters: inducing unequal surplus for buyers and sellers, shifting 
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the demand the curve, and changing the elasticity of supply at the competitive equilibrium.  And 
the markets continued to converge to the competitive equilibrium (Smith, 1962).  With Arlington 
Williams he continued pushing the boundaries of the environment such that one side of the 
market would have zero surplus at the competitive equilibrium, and he experimented with 
different types of institutions such as posted offer, posted bid, and sealed bid-offer auction 
(Smith and Williams, 1982 and 1990).   
Similarly, when Vernon and his co-authors, Gerry Suchanek and Arlie Williams, applied 
the double auction institution to their famous asset market experiment, they expected to 
establish a baseline with no bubbles (1988).  What they found was that transparency was not 
sufficient to prevent bubbles.  Again, he made changes to the experiment, adding short selling 
and conducting it with professional traders, and still the markets bubbled.  The subjects 
disabused him (his often-used word) of his way of seeing things. 
The result of the double auction research program was more than a nuanced 
understanding of the dynamic paths to the competitive equilibrium.  In an article published in 
Economic Inquiry twenty years after his first double auction paper appeared in print, Vernon was 
still thinking about how the double auction experiment had changed how he thought about 
markets (1982).   The point of the double auction experiment is not simply that participants find 
the point at which supply and demand cross, thereby objectively validating what we teach in 
principles of microeconomics.   The point of the double auction experiment, or “the most 
significant fact about this [price] system,” as Hayek famously puts it, “is the economy of 
knowledge with which it operates, or how little the individual participants need to know in order 
to be able to take the right action” (Hayek, 1945, pp. 526-7).  In the form of bids and asks, the 
institution communicates all the information about everyone else that an individual needs to 
know.  The problem that society faces—and that a double auction market amazingly solves in a 
mere few minutes—is how to aggregate and utilize the dispersed knowledge of the participants 
so as to secure the most efficient use of resources. 
If we suspend our own beliefs about what we need to know to solve our models or teach 
a graph, and listen to what our participants say through their actions, the double auction 
experiment changes how we think about the price system.  The problem is not just about how 
we think about equating marginal costs with marginal revenue, but how real people think and go 
about their very real problem of buying and selling.   To sincerely listen to our laboratory 
participants means to take seriously the notion that our participants may not see the problem as 
we see the problem, which is rather humbling.   To quote Wittgenstein again, “The edifice of your 
pride has to be dismantled. And that is terribly hard work” (1980; p. 26e). 
Vernon, though, makes it look easy.   He is one of the most self-effacing scholars I know; 
he sets a high bar both in the laboratory and in everyday life.  And it is that genuine modesty and 
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honesty with himself and others that comprises the lens by which he has made a career of 
burning points, the most significant of which is his example of how a model scientist and human 
being thinks about economic science. 
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